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616 WEMYSS v. SUPERIOR COURT [38 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18508. In Bank. Mar. 19, 1952.] 
EDWIN D. WEMYSS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELP-
ERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 439, Real Party in 
Interest. 
[1] Mandamus-To Courts-Depositions.-There is no appeal from 
an order refusing to quash a subpoena requiring a witness to 
testify by deposition, and mandamus is the proper remedy. 
[2] Statutes- Construction- Giving Effect to Statute.- Where 
possible, all parts of a statute should be construed together 
and construed to achieve harmony between seemingly con-
flicting provisions rather than holding that there is an ,irrecon-
cilable inconsistency. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) 
[3] Depositions-Securing Attendance.-Although the first sub-
division of Code Civ. Proc., § 1986, seems to conflict with the 
third subdivision as to whether a subpoena requiring attend-
ance on the taking of a deposition may be issued by the clerk 
of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending or 
by the clerk of the superior court of the county wherein the 
attendance is required, both subdivisions may be given effect 
by construing subdivision one to authorize the clerk of the 
court in the county where the action is pending to issue the 
subpoena in cases where the witness resides in that county or 
within 100 miles of the court, the reach of the subpoena, and 
his attendance is required within the county or the 100-mile 
radius; in cases where the witness resides beyond the reach 
of the subpoena of that court it is issued by the clerk of the 
court of the county in which the attendance is required, with 
the limitation that the witness resides in that county or within 
100 miles of that court. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Alameda County to quash a subpoena. Writ granted. 
Lafayette J. Smallpage, Carl M. Gould and Harold J. Willis 
for Petitioner. 
James F. Galliano and C. Paul Paduck for Real Party in 
Interest. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, §§ 134, 170; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 363. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, §54; [2] Statutes, 
§ 164(1); [3] Depositions, § 17. 
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CARTBR, J.-An action was commenced in the Superior 
Court in San Joaquin County by plaintiff against several 
labor organizations for injunctive and damage relief for 
picketing by defendants. On the application of one of the 
defendants, the clerk of the Superior Court of Alameda 
County issued a subpoena requiring plaintiff, petitioner here, 
to attend before a notary public in Oakland, Alameda County, 
to testify by deposition and to produce certain documents. 
Plaintiff made a motion in the Alameda County Superior 
Court to quash the subpoena on the ground that the clerk 
of that court had no authority to issue it, as plaintiff resides 
in San Joaquin County and the action is pending in the 
court there. Plaintiff resides within 100 miles of Oakland 
where the subpoena required attendance. The court granted 
the motion insofar as the subpoena required the production 
of documents, but denied it with respect to its order that 
he appear to testify. Petitioner, by this proceeding in manda-
mus, seeks to have the court of Alameda County ordered to 
quash the subpoena in all respects on the same ground ad-
vanced in his motion. 
[1] There is no appeal from the order of denial and 
mandamus is the proper remedy. (See Brown v. Superior 
Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878] ; Strauss v. Superior 
C01trt, 36 Cal.2d 396 [224 P.2d 726] ; Carnation Co. v. Superior 
Cm~rt, 96 CaLApp.2d 138 [214 P.2d 552] .) 
'fhe question presented requires an interpretation of sec-
tion 1986 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as 
follows: 
'' 1. A subpoena is issued as follows : To require attendance 
before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or upon the 
taking of a deposition in an action or proceeding pending 
therein, it is issued by the clerk of the court in which the 
action or proceeding is pending, under the seal of the court, 
or if there is no clerk or seal then by a judge or justice of 
such court; 
"2. To require attendance before a commissioner appointed 
to take testimony by a court of a foreign country, of the 
United States, or of any other state in the United States, or 
before any officer or officers empowered by the laws o£ the 
United States to take testimony, it may be issued by the clerk 
of the superior court of the county in which the witness is 
to be examined, under the seal of such court ; 
'' 3. To require attendance out of court, in cases not provided 
for in subdivision one, before a judge, justice, or other officer 
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authorized to administer oaths or take testimony in any matter 
under the laws of this state, it is issueCJ. by the judge, justice, 
or other officer before whom the attendance is required. 
''If the subpoena is issued to require attendance before 
a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, it is issued by the 
clerk, as of course, upon the application of the party desiring 
it. If it is issued to require attendance before a commissioner 
or other officer upon the taking of a deposition, it must be 
issued by the clerk of the superior court of the' county wherein 
the attendance is req1tired upon the application of the party 
desiring it upon proper showing by affidavit to be filed with 
said clerk." (Italics added.) 
Petitioner contends that under the facts presented the 
only court which may issue the subpoena for a deposition is 
the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, relying 
upon the italicized portion of the first subdivision. Defendants 
rely upon the italicized portion of the last paragraph in the 
third subdivision, urging that the clerk of the court in the 
county in which the attendance for the deposition is required 
must issue the subpoena. 
In 1872, when the Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, 
the first subdivision made no mention of taking a deposition 
and the process was issued under the seal of the court before 
which the attendance was required or in which the issue was 
pending. Subdivision three read substantially the same as 
the present second subdivision, except that it required that 
the subpoena be issued by the judge. Subdivision two was 
substantially like the first paragraph of the present third sub-
division, except that no mention was made of excepting cases 
not provided for in subdivision one. In 1907 (Stats. 1907, 
p. 730) the section was amended, stating subdivisions one and 
two and the first paragraph of subdivision three in the same 
language as is now used. The last paragraph of subdivision 
three was different in that the last sentence required an order 
of the court or judge for the issuance of the subpoena. The 
code commissioner's note on the 1907 amendment recited: 
''By this amendment and the amendments to § 1991, it is 
intended to change the rule as to the issuance of subpoenas 
so as to provide that a subpoena to give testimony by deposi-
tion must in all cases be issued by the court in which the 
deposition is to be used, and to provide an adequate process 
for the punishment of contempts committed in disobedience 
to a subpoena.'' Section 1986 was last amended in 1929 
(Stats. 1929, p. 197) to read as it does now, that is, to authorize 
Mar.1952) WEMYss v. SuPERIOR CoURT 
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the clerk to issue the subpoena without court order, thus 
changing the last sentence in the second paragraph of subdi-
vision three. 
It might appear from a cursory reading of section 
1986 that the first italicized portion conflicts with the last 
italicized part, because in the first it says the clerk of the 
court in the county where the action is pending issues the 
process, and in the latter, the clerk of the county where the 
attendance is required. The commissioner's note on the 1907 
amendment seems to indicate that only the clerk of the former 
court was to have the issuing power. 
Factually the same question was before this court in 1925, 
where we construed the statute as it existed after the 1907 
amendment. (Pollak v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 389 [240 
P. 1006].) As we have seen the later amendment in 1929 
did nothing more than eliminate the necessity of a court order 
before the clerk could issue the process as provided in sub-
division three. Hence, the statute was the same as it now is 
for our purposes. In the Pollak case the action was pending in 
a justice's court of the City and County of San Francisco. 
Pursuant to section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
plaintiff in the action gave notice that defendants' deposition 
would be taken before a notary in Napa in Napa County. 
Defendants resided in San Francisco County, but less than 
50 miles from Napa. At that time section 1989 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure provided that a witness was not obliged 
to attend as a witness before any court or officer outside the 
county where he resided, unless the distance was less than 50 
miles. Since then the distance has been increased to 100 miles 
(Stats. 1935, p. 942). Plaintiff, under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, section 1986(3), obtained an order from the Napa 
County Superior Court to the clerk of that court for the 
issuance of a subpoena for attendance at the taking of the 
deposition in Napa. Subpoenas were accordingly issued and 
defendants, petitioners in this court in the case, sought to have 
them set aside by the Napa County Superior Court. Relief 
was denied and they petitioned for certiorari to annul the 
order of denial in this court. The petition was denied despite 
petitioners' claim that the Napa County court had no juris-
diction to order the subpoenas, because the action was pend-
ing in San Francisco where they resided. The court said : 
''That portion of subdivision 3 of said section 1986 which 
forms the basis for the granting of the order herein com-
plained of declares that a subpoena issued in accordance there-
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with requiring the attendance of a witness before an officer 
upon the taking of a deposition 'must be issued by the clerk of 
the superior court of the county wherein the attendance is 
required upon the order of such court or of a judge thereof, 
which order may be issued ex parte.' In the case of Scott v. 
Shields, 8 Cal.App. 12 [96 P. 385], in dealing with an apparent 
conflict which arose between certain provisions of said section 
1986, as a result of an amendment added thereto in 1907 (Stats. 
1907, p. 730), it was held to be proper for a judge of a superior 
court, upon the request of a plaintiff in an action pending in 
another county, to grant an order directing the clerk to issue 
a subpoena requiring a witness to attend before a notary 
public for the taking of the deposition of said witness to be 
used in said action, and that if the witness refused to answer, 
it was mandatory upon said judge, under whose direction the 
subpoena issued, to compel said witness to answer and to 
complete his deposition. 
''The only limitation placed upon the territorial force and 
effect of a subpoena issued out of a court of record is found 
in section 1989 of said code, which reads as follows : 'A witness 
is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge, 
justice, or any other officer, out of the county in which he 
resides, unless the distance be less thmi fifty miles from his 
place of residence to the place of trial,' and in the case of 
Met·rill v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 55 [164 P. 340], it was 
expressly held that a subpoena issued by the clerk of the 
superior court, pursuant to the provisions of said subdivision 
3 of said section 1986, as amended in 1907, had the same 
territorial force and effect as a subpoena issued by the clerk 
requiring the attendance before the court, and 'may require 
the attendance of a witness even though he resides outside the 
county but within the fifty-mile limit.' 
'' ... it is apparent, in view of the law as interpreted in 
the two cases above cited, that the judge of the Superior Court 
of Napa County was authorized by said subdivision 3 of 
section 1986 of said code to grant the order for said subpoena, 
and that the subpoena issued pursuant to said order carried 
sufficient territorial force and effect to require the attendance 
of petitioners as witnesses outside the county in which they 
resided, the distance being less than fifty miles from the place 
of their respective residences to the place where they were 
required to attend.'' (Pollak v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 389, 
391 [240 P. 1006] .) 
Petitioner argues, however, that the court in the Pollak 
Mar.1952] WEMYSS v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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case was concerned with the limit of the jurisdiction of a court 
to serve a subpoena, rather than the problem of which cou,rt 
had power to issue the process; that in cases where the wit-
nesses' residence is within the range (100 miles) of the sub-
poena power of the court in the county where the action is 
pending that court has the issuance power under subdivision 
one, and the provision in subdivision three comes into play 
only when the residence of the witness is outside that range; 
that such construction recognizes the sound policy of having, 
whenever possible, the court where the action is pending, and 
which will try the case, as the one to determine what ques-
tions are proper, etc., in event of a refusal to answer questions. 
We agree that the primary question involved in the Pollak 
case was the permissive territorial range of a subpoena. While 
factually a situation similar to that in the instant case was 
presented, the court made no reference to the specific ques-
tion here involved, namely, the apparent conflict between 
subdivisions one and three of section 1986. In Scott v. Shields, 
8 Cal.App. 12 [96 P. 385), referred to in the Pollak case, 
the question was whether the notary, before whom the deposi-
tion was to be taken, or the clerk of the court was authorized 
to issue a subpoena (8 Cal.App. 12, 14), and there was no 
discussion of the above mentioned conflict in section 1986. 
Merrill v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 55 [164 P. 340], re-
ferred to in the Pollak case, is subject to the same comment. 
There is nothing helpful in Burns v. Superior Co~trt, 140 Cal. 
1 [73 P. 597]. The case must, therefore, be determined by 
proper statutory construction. 
[2] Where possible, all parts of a statute should be read 
together and construed to achieve harmony between seemingly 
conflicting provisions rather than holding that there is an 
irreconcilable inconsistency. (Code Oiv. Proc., § 1858; Estate 
of Stevens, 27 Cal.2d 108 [162 P.2d 918] ; County of Los 
.,;lngeles v. Craig, 52 Oal.App.2d 450 [126 P.2d 448]; 23 Cal. 
J ur. 792-793.) [3] If section 1986 is construed to mean 
that, by reason of subdivision three, in all cases a subpoena for 
a deposition is to be issued by the clerk of the court in the 
county where attendance is required, then the italicized part 
of subdivision one is rendered nugatory. Both subdivisions 
may be given effect, however, by construing subdivision one 
to authorize the clerk of the court in the county where the 
action is pending to issue the subpoena for a deposition in 
cases where the witness resides in that county or within 100 
miles of the court, the reach of the subpoena, and his attend-
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ance is required within the county or the 100-mile radius. 
In cases where the witness resides beyond the reach of the 
subpoena of that court it is isslJ_ed by the clerk of the court 
of the county in which his attendance is required, with the 
limitation, of course, that the witness resides in that county 
or within 100 miles of that court. There is other wording in 
section 1986 which supports that interpretation. It will be 
recalled that the first part of subdivif!lion three refers to re-
quiring attendance in cases "not provided for in subdivision 
one" which may mean in cases beyond the territorial reach 
of the court in the county where the action is pending, as 
provided by section 1989 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
This construction also harmonizes with and makes effective 
the latter section which reads: ''A witness is not obliged to 
attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice, or any 
other officer, out of the county in which he resides, unless the 
distance be less than one hundred miles from his place of 
residence to the place of trial." It is, at least partly, in accord 
with the code commissioner's note, supra, in that in all cases 
permitted by section 1989, the subpoena is issued by the clerk 
of the court in the county in which the action is pending. 
Moreover, there are valid reasons, as urged by petitioner, 
and above mentioned, why the court where the action is 
pending should in all cases possible issue the subpoena and 
entertain the proceedings under section 1991 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure when the witness disobeys the subpoena. 
We hold, therefore, that the clerk of the Superior Court of 
Alameda County had no jurisdiction to issue the subpoena 
and that court, respondent here, should quash it. 
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the Superior 
Court of Alameda County had no jurisdiction to issue the 
subpoena. However, in my opinion, there is no basis for 
distinguishing Pollak v. Superior Cmrrt, 197 Cal. 389 [240 
P. 1006], and it should be overruled. 
In the Pollak case, the court failed to mention the con-
flict between subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 1986, Code 
of Civil Procedure, and appears to have been misled by the 
importance of the territorial issue. But the decisive question 
was stated as follows: ''In the case at bar the witnesses whose 
Mar. 1952] SouTHWESTERN lNv. CoRP. v. CITY OF L. A. 623 
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testimony is sought to be taken in Napa County reside in 
San Francisco, at the very place of trial, and are available 
therein as witnesses at any time. In view of that situation 
the question arises as to whether or not a party to an action 
may, in any event, require the attendance of a witness outside 
of the county in which he resides and wherein the action is 
pending, for the purpose of giving a deposition, even though 
the place where such witness is required to attend be less 
than fifty miles from his place of residence.'' (Pp. 392-393.) 
This is exactly the situation which is presented by the peti-
tion of \!If emyss. 
Pollak was obliged to obey the subpoena issued by the 
Superior Court of Napa County because, "in view of the 
broad language of said section 2021 of said code, it would 
seem that authority is granted to take depositions in any 
county, irrespective of the place where the witness resides 
or the place wherein the action is pending, provided only 
the distance between the place of residence of said witness 
and the place where his deposition shall be taken be less than 
fifty miles." (Pp. 393-394.) This is directly contrary to 
the determination of the same question in the present case. 
[L.A. No. 19306. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.] 
SOUTHWESTERN INVESTMENT CORPORATION (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Other than for the correction 
of clerical errors, the recall of a remittitur may be ordered 
on the ground of fraud, mistake or inadvertence; the recall 
may not be granted to correct judicial error. 
[2] !d.-Remittitur-Recall-Time of Application.-A motion to 
recall a remittitur must be promptly made; while preparation 
of voluminous notes and attempts to engage attorneys might 
excuse a reasonable delay, unsuccessful attempts to invoke 
other means of redress, such as persuading a city council to 
act voluntarily in the matter in question, appealing to local 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error,§ 633; Am.Jur., Appeal and 
Error, § 1263. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5, 7, 8] Appeal and Error, § 1773; 
[2] Appeal and Error, § 1779; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1775. 
